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A Theory of Predictive Dissonance:
Predictive Processing Presents a
New Take on Cognitive Dissonance
Roope Oskari Kaaronen*
Department of Social Research, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland
This article is a comparative study between predictive processing (PP, or predictive
coding) and cognitive dissonance (CD) theory. The theory of CD, one of the most
influential and extensively studied theories in social psychology, is shown to be highly
compatible with recent developments in PP. This is particularly evident in the notion
that both theories deal with strategies to reduce perceived error signals. However,
reasons exist to update the theory of CD to one of “predictive dissonance.” First, the
hierarchical PP framework can be helpful in understanding varying nested levels of
CD. If dissonance arises from a cascade of downstream and lateral predictions and
consequent prediction errors, dissonance can exist at a multitude of scales, all the
way up from sensory perception to higher order cognitions. This helps understand
the previously problematic dichotomy between “dissonant cognitive relations” and
“dissonant psychological states,” which are part of the same perception-action process
while still hierarchically distinct. Second, since PP is action-oriented, it can be read to
support recent action-based models of CD. Third, PP can potentially help us understand
the recently speculated evolutionary origins of CD. Here, the argument is that responses
to CD can instill meta-learning which serves to prevent the overfitting of generative
models to ephemeral local conditions. This can increase action-oriented ecological
rationality and enhanced capabilities to interact with a rich landscape of affordances.
The downside is that in today’s world where social institutions such as science a priori
separate noise from signal, some reactions to predictive dissonance might propagate
ecologically unsound (underfitted, confirmation-biased) mental models such as climate
denialism.
Keywords: predictive processing, predictive coding, cognitive dissonance, affordance theory, ecological
rationality, cultural evolution
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INTRODUCTION
Cognitive dissonance (CD) theory is arguably one of the most
influential and extensively studied theories in social psychology.
Dissonance theory continues even 60 years after its original
formulation by Festinger (1957), in A Theory of Cognitive
Dissonance, to develop and inspire new research (Cooper, 2007;
Harmon-Jones et al., 2015). However, it is sensible to attempt
to bring even the most influential and mature theories up to
date with current scientific advances. The present article aims
to do precisely that by integrating insights from CD theory and
predictive processing (PP, also known as predictive coding). In
this article, I accommodate dissonance theory in the broader
framework of PP, and call this synthesis “predictive dissonance.”
PP, a unificatory attempt at understanding action, perception,
and learning, has already found multiple applications in cognitive
science, machine learning, and brain theories (for overviews, see
Friston, 2010; Clark, 2016), but its application to traditionally
more social psychological domains still seems scarce (although
see Ramstead et al., 2016). I suggest in the present article that
dissonance theory – in its original form (Festinger, 1957) as well
as its more recent “action-based” (Harmon-Jones et al., 2015)
and evolutionary (Egan et al., 2007) propositions – is highly
compatible with PP, and a comparative take on the two theories
can be mutually informative. This article is therefore an attempt
to reconcile a classic theory (Brehm, 1956; Festinger, 1957;
Festinger and Carlsmith, 1959) with a novel take on cognitive
processes.
The rationale for writing such a comparative study is
not to “explain away” the theory of CD with a newer
theoretical framework, but rather to provide fresh perspectives
for interpreting what CD is (related to the concept of “prediction
error” in PP), where it is (located at varying hierarchical steps of
an action-oriented multi-level generative model) and why such a
cognitive phenomenon might exist to begin with (it can motivate
ecologically rational meta-learning, preventing the overfitting
of cognitive models). The present study is therefore perhaps
best understood as providing evidential diversity (Kuorikoski
and Marchionni, 2016) for interpreting a widely known and
studied cognitive phenomenon. As this article concludes, CD is,
as a mental and social phenomenon, as important a research
topic as ever. Furthermore, Festinger (1957) original work was,
even in the light of new advances, quite well on track, and its
basic premises should not be dismissed. However, bringing the
theory of CD up to date with recent developments in embodied
and situated cognitive science, particularly by associating our
motivation for “dissonance reduction” (Festinger, 1957) with
“prediction error reduction” (Friston, 2010; Clark, 2016) provides
a clearer picture of what CD is, why it exists, and how and why it
structures our lives and cultures so thoroughly.
The present text is structured as follows. Section “Predictive
Processing: A Brief Overview” presents a brief introduction to
PP. Section “Predictive Dissonance,” in turn, presents the theory
of CD in a nutshell and proceeds to a comparative analysis and
synthesis between PP and CD theory. Section “An Evolutionary
Rationale for Cognitive Dissonance?” presents a potential PP-
informed evolutionary rationale regarding the origins of CD.
Section “Underfitted Generative Models and Ecological Crises”
briefly discusses some current ecologically unsound forms of CD
(related to, e.g., climate denialism) and discusses these in terms of
the propositions made in earlier sections. Section “Conclusion”
summarizes the core arguments of this article.
PREDICTIVE PROCESSING: A BRIEF
OVERVIEW
Predictive processing, many of its proponents (e.g., Friston, 2010;
Seth, 2014; Clark, 2015, 2016; Allen and Friston, 2018) argue, is a
particularly promising unificatory account of perception, action,
experience, and expectation, thereby providing a theoretical (and
increasingly empirical) account of a fundamentally embodied
and environmentally situated mind. In this section, I introduce
the main tenets of PP, particularly drawing on Clark’s (2016)
work, acknowledging that any brief introduction to such a
multifaceted, multidisciplinary, and multilevel account of the
mind will be incomplete. Note also, as Clark (2016, Ch. 10)
himself emphasizes, this is certainly not the only plausible
account of PP, otherwise often known as “(hierarchical) predictive
coding.” Therefore, this section attempts to describe particularly
the aspects of PP relevant for CD theory, which in turn is
defined and compared to PP in Section “Predictive Dissonance”
below. The reader is humbly directed particularly to Clark (2015,
2016) and Friston (2010) for a greatly more comprehensive
introductory account to PP.
At its core, PP consists of two main features. First,
perception actively involves the use of a Bayesian1 hierarchy
of acquired prior2 knowledge, which serves to predict online
the incoming sensory barrage. Thus, from the PP perspective,
the brain is “an inference machine,” which is in the business
of actively predicting and explaining its sensations (Friston,
2010, p. 129). This predictive faculty is known as the multi-
level hierarchical “generative model” (ibid.). In lay terms, the
PP narrative of embodied and situated cognition entails that
the brain is a “predictive engine,” actively predicting sensory
input, contrasting these “downstream” predictions to “upstream”
sensory information. This stands against what Clark (2015, p. 5)
describes as “standard (passive, feedforward)” images of sensory
processing, where the brain is perceived “as passive and stimulus-
driven, taking energetic inputs from the senses and turning them
into a coherent percept by a kind of step-wise build-up moving
from the simplest features to the more complex.” Instead, PP
proposes a “Bayesian flip”: the predictive brain predicts incoming
low-level sensory cues from the best prior models of what is likely
to be out there (ibid.). With a simple Bayesian twist, perceptual
content is then determined by the hypothesis that generates the
best predictions – or in Bayesian terms, the hypothesis with the
highest posterior probability (Hohwy et al., 2008, p. 688). The
cascades of downstream models are, of course, experience- and
1See, e.g., Friston (2010) or Seth (2014) for concise accounts of the “Bayesian brain”
hypothesis.
2Priors can here be defined as the probability distributions or densities “of the
causes of data that encodes beliefs about those causes before observing the data”
(Friston, 2010, p. 129).
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context-laden in that they are sculpted by prior experience and
contextual factors (see particularly Ch. 9 in Clark, 2016).
Second, the use of prior knowledge – which primarily serves a
predictive function – is, according to Clark (2015, p. 5) “subject to
a constant kind of second-order assessment (known as “precision
estimation”),” which determines weightings assigned to specific
predictions at all levels of information-processing (from direct
sensory inputs to higher order cognition) as well as to different
aspects of incoming sensory signals. In other words, different
weightings are assigned to prediction errors, accordingly with the
estimated reliability (inverse variance) of the incoming sensory
barrage. Highly weighted, or highly reliable, prediction errors are
more likely to update the generative model (and vice versa). By
means of updating the generative model, organisms are, in the
long term, capable of making the best possible guesses about the
true causes of sensory stimuli and thus inferring the external
causes that produce sensory data (Friston, 2010).
What results is a dynamic picture of a mind constantly
forming generative, forward-looking hypotheses, which are
tested against sensory input, which in turn may or may
not update the generative predictive model (depending on
the weightings assigned to prediction errors). To slightly
complicate the picture – which, it should be noted, can be
complicated quite a lot further – the Bayesian narrative of
the mind proposed by PP suggests that generative models are
hierarchical, or multi-level predictive systems consisting of nested
hypotheses within hypotheses (Figure 1). These hierarchies range
from low-level predictions (“often highly spatially/temporally
precise”) to increasingly abstract and generalizable high-level
predictions (Clark, 2016, p. 30). Prediction errors, within this
hierarchical network, flow upstream and laterally,3 thereby
adjusting generative predictions (which again might result in
further unpredicted input, sending error signals to even higher
level predictions, see Figure 1) (Clark, 2016, p. 143–146).
The upshot is that the intricate balancing of predictions and
prediction errors helps organisms such as ours not only to learn
from sensory input but also not to learn from low-weighted
prediction errors. Therefore, Clark (2016, p. 35; emphasis added)
writes, the “task of the predictive brain is to account for (to
accommodate or “explain away”) the incoming or “driving”
sensory signal by means of a matching top-down prediction.”
Note that, importantly, the sensory signal can be reacted to in
various ways, ranging from the updating of the predictive model,
suppressing the error signal, recruiting alternate hypotheses,
or altering movement in the world so as to harvest different
information from the environment (this is also known as
“selective sampling,” ibid.). A reader acquainted with CD theory
might predict where this argument is heading – I will return
to these alternative strategies for coping with error signals in
broader detail and contrast them with dissonance reduction
mechanisms in Section “A Comparative Take: Prediction Error
and Dissonance Reduction.”
3In PP literature, it is common to find descriptions of predictions and prediction
errors flowing hierarchically (downstream and upstream). However, as Clark
(2016, p. 308) notes, this is just a shorthand, since “a great deal of predictive
information is also passed laterally within levels.”
The “predictive engine” of the brain is, according to the
PP narrative, also the fundamental driver for action. This is
because the brain also makes active forward-looking predictive
models for proprioceptive states (i.e., states related to bodily
movement and position). If organisms make forward predictions
of proprioceptive states, reducing the signal error for these
predictions implies moving bodily parts to predicted locations
(see particularly Ch 4. in Clark, 2016). Predictions for movement
are, it follows, “self-fulfilling prophecies” (Clark, 2016, p. 111).4
For instance, expecting the sensory flows of what it would be like
if you were to write an academic article on a keyboard, is what
(for good or ill) drives one to do so, since any other bodily state
would induce prediction error.
The long-term reduction of prediction error, the PP narrative
continues, is essential for an organism’s survival in the world.
Ultimately, this boils down to the notion that by minimizing
prediction errors in the long term, organisms are better equipped
to avoid surprising environmental states and encounters which
risk their survival. Friston (2010) elaborates this idea much more
in his free energy principle, which argues that organisms must
avoid surprising states to maintain the far-from equilibrium
state of self-organization which we call life (see also Friston and
Stephan, 2007; Clark, 2017b; Allen and Friston, 2018; Appendix
2 in Clark, 2016). This is a complex information theoretic and
thermodynamic argument which will not be advanced further
in the present text, but in lay terms, it simply entails that an
organism is more likely to survive in a world it can predict as
well as possible (Clark, 2017b, pp. 4–5). The implication is that
the predictive organism’s generative cognitive models are, in this
respect, locally imperfect but highly generalizable models of the
world5 (Clark, 2016). Equipped with such models, organisms
successfully predict incoming sensory inputs to infer and learn
about the causal structures of the external world, all the while
avoiding unpleasant and hazardous surprises.
A picture emerges of the predictive mind as one fundamentally
driven to guide successful behavior by actively minimizing
prediction error. Accordingly, Clark (2016, p. 295) writes: “The
predictive brain is thus not an insulated inference engine
‘in the head’ so much as an action-oriented engagement
engine, delivering a rolling grip on task-salient opportunities.”
Since humans live in complex socio-cultural and material
4Of course, these forward-looking and action-oriented views of the mind are far
from new. As Clark (2016, p. 289) notes, such ideas can be readily found in the
phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty (1962), although one could as justifiably add
pragmatists such as Dewey (1896) and James (1884) to the mix (next to obvious
enactivists in the vein of, e.g., Varela et al., 1991). A less known similar theory
of perception can also be found in Michael Polanyi (1965; 1958) “tacit inference”
(or “from-to” structure of knowledge), where perception occurs from embodied
“tacit knowledge” to a target of perception, which is perceived in light of embodied
(prior) tacit knowledge. Polanyi (1965, p. 2) tacit inference is action-oriented and
predictive: “When we perform a skill, we attend focally to its outcome, while being
aware subsidiarily of the several moves we co-ordinate to this effect.” What these
otherwise greatly intriguing theories of perception-action seem to lack is a coherent
account of the mechanism of how (and why) these “tacit” or embodied predictive
priors are updated.
5This is similar to Conant and Ross Ashby (1970, p. 89) cybernetic discussion on
what makes a “good regulator”: “the living brain, so far as it is to be successful and
efficient as a regulator for survival, must proceed, in learning, by the formation of
a model (or models) of its environment.”
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FIGURE 1 | Sensory flow of prediction and perception. In the hierarchical generative model, prediction errors flow upstream (and laterally), and predictions flow
downstream.
environments, any inference engine of this sort must be capable
of adapting to a broad variety of contexts. This notion and its
possible implications for understanding CD are further discussed
in the latter half of the present article.
PREDICTIVE DISSONANCE
“When dissonance is aroused, the fun begins in figuring out the
best way to reduce it.”
Cooper (2007, p. 109)
To the author’s best knowledge, comparative takes on PP
and CD theory, a long-term staple, and dominant paradigm
particularly in social psychological research (Cooper, 2007), are
either non-existent or lacking. Arguably, to reconcile the theory
of CD in the light of recent developments in multidisciplinary
studies in PP is insightful in two domains. First, it provides
a case that dissonance theory, even though updatable, is still
in many respects on track with cutting-edge research even six
decades after its initial formulation by Festinger (1957). This is
particularly the case since CD theory and PP both deal extensively
with the reduction of subjectively surprising states, or dissonance
and prediction error, respectively. Indeed, as is shown below,
prediction error and CD appear to be processually related, if not
at times parallel, phenomena.
Second, a PP take on CD can, I argue, further enlighten recent
developments in “action-based” dissonance studies (Harmon-
Jones et al., 2015) and help us understand some of the
evolutionary underpinnings of CD. These are relevant topics
for clarification, since there seems to exist, one the one hand,
accounts promoting the idea of dissonance having evolutionary
origins (Egan et al., 2007), while others (Perlovsky, 2013)
altogether question the compatibility between human evolution
and dissonance theory. Moreover, reconciling CD theory with
PP – a multidisciplinary theory encompassing machine learning,
neural networks, embodied and enactive cognitive science, and
ecological psychology – is helpful in relating the phenomenon
of CD to a variety of other rapidly developing fields potentially
relevant for dissonance research. To begin this comparative
treatise, in the following section, I provide a brief overview of the
theory of CD.
Dissonance in a Nutshell
Festinger (1957), in his seminal work A Theory of Cognitive
Dissonance, defines CD as the psychological discomfort occurring
when one experiences two mutually inconsistent “elements of
cognition.” Cognitive elements are for Festinger (1957, p. 9–
10) what a “person knows about himself, about his behavior,
and about his surroundings.” These cognitive elements not only
“represent knowledge about oneself ” (feelings, pains, desires,
attitudes, etc.) but also represent environmental and causal states,
concerning “the world in which one lives” or “what is where,
what leads to what,” and so forth. While Festinger’s definition
of cognitive elements is vague – which is understandable, as
Festinger’s pioneering work was conducted at the dawn of the
cognitive revolution in psychology – it is clear from his definition
that “relations of consonance and dissonance” can hold between
all pairs of these elements (ibid.).
For Festinger (1957, p. 10–11), these elements of cognition
form “by and large” a “mirror, or map,” of reality. Therefore, it
follows that keeping this map or mirror “responsive to reality” –
by means of actively reducing dissonance – aids us in maintaining
a grip on and surviving in the world (ibid.). Accordingly,
Festinger (1957, p. 11) concludes that the major point of
dissonance theory “is that the reality which impinges on a person
will exert pressures in the direction of bringing the appropriate
cognitive elements into correspondence with that reality.” Festinger
(1957, p. 3) emphasizes that CD is “a motivating factor in
its own right,” and that the “existence of dissonance, being
psychologically uncomfortable, will motivate the person to try
to reduce the dissonance and achieve consonance.” Dissonance
reduction and avoidance, in turn, according to the original
formulation of dissonance theory, can be achieved via four
strategies as follows.
1 Changing a Behavioral Cognitive Element
Dissonance can be reduced by changing behavior
(Festinger, 1957, p. 19). This is for Festinger (ibid.)
the “simplest and easiest way” of reducing dissonance.
To use Festinger’s example, if one experiences dissonance
when smoking (since she or he knows that smoking is
unhealthy), dissonance can be reduced by quitting the
smoking habit. Or, to use another simple example of
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Festinger’s (ibid.), if “a person starts out on a picnic and
notices that is has begun to rain, he may very well turn
around and go home.”
2 Changing an Environmental Cognitive Element
Dissonance can be reduced by modulating the environment
or moving about in the material or social world (Festinger,
1957, p. 20). To illustrate the former, Festinger (ibid.)
invites the reader to imagine a man pacing in his living
room at home, fearfully jumping over a particular spot
on the floor for no valid reason. This induces CD, since
the man is well aware that there is no reason to fear
this particular spot. Festinger (ibid.) notes that the man
could, however, reduce this dissonance by breaking a hole
in the floor in that particular place. By modulating his
material environment, the man could therefore reduce
CD. Festinger (ibid.) calls the modulation of physical
environments a “relatively rare occurrence,” a notion which
I will challenge in Section “An Evolutionary Rationale for
Cognitive Dissonance?,” since humanity as a whole is in fact
very active in constructing their cultural and material niche.
Changing social environments, Festinger (ibid.) argues, is
a more common affair. For instance, “a person who is
habitually very hostile toward other people may surround
himself with persons who provoke hostility.” We can
also imagine the aforementioned smoker seeking toward
environments (e.g., a smoking room) where she or he would
experience less dissonance. Importantly, Festinger does not
imagine here a passive organism, but rather evokes the idea
that we can actively move about in the world to reduce
dissonance, for instance, by selecting the social groups we
interact with (ibid.). Changing environmental cognitive
elements can therefore also be achieved by moving to a
different social or physical context.
3 Adding New Cognitive Elements
Festinger (1957, p. 21–24) emphasizes that even if
dissonance cannot be eliminated, it can be reduced by
“adding new cognitive elements.” Three interrelated sub-
strategies emerge here as follows.
a Focusing on Supportive Beliefs
Dissonance can be reduced by focusing on more
supportive beliefs or reducing the importance of
conflicting beliefs. A person might “actively seek new
information that would reduce the total dissonance”
(Festinger, 1957, p. 22). Thus, a smoker might “seek out
and avidly read any material critical of the research which
purported to show that smoking was bad for one’s health”
(ibid.).
b Adding Reconciliatory Cognitive Elements
Dissonance can be reduced by adding cognitive elements
or hypotheses which “reconcile” two dissonant cognitive
elements. A smoker, Festinger (ibid.) notes, could “find
out all about accidents and death rates in automobiles,”
reducing the smoker’s dissonance by discounting it
against the “more severe” risks of driving. This is,
essentially, what dissonance researchers have later called
self-justification (see Tavris and Aronson, 2008).
c Changing Conflictive Cognitive Elements
Dissonance can be reduced by even arbitrary changes in
beliefs, attitudes, or values. Therefore, finally, a smoker
might reconsider their belief about the nature of what is
“good” or correct behavior (see Festinger, 1957, p. 22–
23). In other words, finally, the smoker could conclude
that “I simply enjoy smoking and therefore, as I consider
it a good behavior, I shall continue to do so.”
4 Avoidance of Dissonance
Next to dissonance reduction, Festinger (1957, p. 29–
31) emphasizes that there are also strong tendencies to
“avoid the occurrence of dissonance altogether.” In other
words, sometimes people will “actively avoid situations and
information which would likely increase the dissonance”
(Festinger, 1957, p. 3). If a person has past experience that a
certain environment or source of information would cause
CD, such environments or information might be actively
avoided (Festinger, 1957, p. 30).
I have presented above the main tenets of the original
composition of dissonance theory (see particularly Ch. 1
in Festinger, 1957, p. 1–31). More recent developments of
dissonance theory, such as its action-based model, are discussed
later in the present article. One notion worth emphasizing
here is the plurality of strategies Festinger (1957) proposes for
dissonance reduction, which include not only attitude change
but also the alteration of behaviors and environments, movement
and interaction in the socio-material realm, and active avoidance
of dissonant information. Although dissonance research, since
Festinger’s seminal work, has largely focused on dissonance
between attitudes or values (Cooper, 2007), I wish to underscore
here that this restrictive position is not one found in Festinger’s
original theory. Indeed, the focus in dissonance research on
attitudinal change is more a product of empirical methodologies,
since attitude change (as revealed by, e.g., surveys or interviews)
is by many considered the simplest method to empirically study
the effects of CD (see Cooper, 2007 for a history of dissonance
research).
A Comparative Take: Prediction Error
and Dissonance Reduction
In the following section, I discuss relevant aspects of PP
with respect to CD theory. I particularly focus on how many
dissonance reduction strategies seem very similar to those found
in prediction error minimization. Therefore, in the following
section, I explicitly relate Festinger (1957) modes of dissonance
reduction (numbered 1–4 above) to PP and prediction error
related concepts. This comparative analysis reveals that PP and
CD theory are notably similar, and that locating CD in the
broader theoretical framework of PP can be mutually informative
for both theories.
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Changing a Behavioral Cognitive Element
Predictive processing posits that prediction error can be reduced
by “performing actions that make our predictions come true”
(Clark, 2016, p. 121). However, note that with the PP framework,
this error reduction mechanism is not merely a reaction to
psychological discomfort (although in certain situations it likely
is). Rather, PP posits that action itself occurs when “physical
motion cancels out prediction errors by producing the trajectory
that yields some predicted sequence of proprioceptive states.”
This “active inference” (Friston, 2009; Adams et al., 2013; Friston
et al., 2016) or “action-oriented PP” (Clark, 2016, p. 122) suggests
that percepts are ongoing attempts to “parse the world in ways apt
for the engagement of that world.” Prediction error reduction, it
follows, is action-oriented, and action is one fundamental strategy
to minimize prediction error. This is a particularly relevant
notion to consider, since recent developments in CD theory have
also suggested an action-based model of dissonance reduction,
where it is proposed that dissonance arises particularly with
“cognitions with action implications are in conflict with each
other, making it difficult to act” (Harmon-Jones et al., 2015). The
action-based model of dissonance is returned to in greater detail
in Section “Why #1: An Action-Based Model of Dissonance.”
This idea of reducing dissonance in order to be in better “touch
with reality” behaviorally is something Festinger (1957, p. 10–
11) was certain to emphasize, although it has escaped much of
later dissonance research (see Cooper, 2007 for an overview).
However, the similarities between dissonance theory and PP, in
this respect, are clear. To return to Festinger (1957, p. 19) simple
analogy, we could imagine the picnicker experiencing “prediction
error” after noticing the rain and reducing this prediction error
by moving to shelter. CD and prediction error seem remarkably
similar in the behavioral domain, and this theme is discussed
in much more detail in Section “An Evolutionary Rationale for
Cognitive Dissonance?.”
Changing an Environmental Cognitive Element
As with CD, prediction error can also be reduced by two distinct
but related strategies, which are the physical modulation of
environments and selective sampling of sensory environments
(Clark, 2016). First, as is elaborated in detail in Section “Why #2:
Overfitting Predictive Models,” humans are organisms which are
particularly adept at constructing their environments in order to
reduce collective prediction error (Clark, 2016, particularly Ch.
9). Indeed, Clark (2016, p. 270) writes: “We humans . . . build, and
repeatedly rebuild, the social, linguistic, and technological worlds
whose regularities then become reflected in the generative models
making the predictions.” In other words, we have a tendency
for building environments which reduce prediction error. While
Festinger (1957, p. 20) did note that CD can be reduced by
altering the physical environment, he called it a “relatively rare
occurrence.” The predictive dissonance account elaborated in
Section “An Evolutionary Rationale for Cognitive Dissonance?”
aims to show that environmental modulation, otherwise known
as niche construction6 (or the process by which an organism alters
6The reader is directed to Odling-Smee et al. (2003) or Constant et al. (2018) for
more detailed discussion on niche construction.
its local environment), is much more common than Festinger
imagined. Nevertheless, recall how Festinger’s living room pacer
reduced dissonance by breaking a hole in the floor. This could
be easily reformulated as reduction of prediction error. If the
man is actively attempting to predict a hole in the ground,
while acting as if this were the case, the exteroceptive sensory
information he encounters – the stimuli picked up from the
external environment, or a perfectly intact floor – would induce
upstream flows of prediction error. This prediction error, in turn,
can be reduced by the act of breaking a hole in the floor.
Second, similar to how Festinger (1957, p. 20) emphasizes the
active role of humans in moving around social environments
to reduce dissonance, Clark (2016, p. 70–71) also underscores
that in order to reduce prediction error, we actively move about
to selectively sample the perceivable world. In other words, we
have a tendency for selectively harvesting sensory information
which is consonant with our predictions. The “dark side” (Clark,
2016, p. 71) of this, confirmation bias, is discussed in more detail
later in this section. However, it is worth noting that this sort
of confirmation bias was particularly what Festinger, a social
psychologist, was interested in. For instance, Festinger (1957,
p. 177) emphasizes that dissonance is often most successfully
reduced by socializing with people who “agree with the cognitions
one wishes to retain and maintain.” Summing up, humans alter
environmental cognitive elements constantly, and this is not only
a matter of modulating the material environment but also one of
moving about in the social and material world so as to actively
select the sensory information we harvest.
Adding New Cognitive Elements
Similar to propositions from dissonance theory, the Bayesian
generative models of PP are active in “finding the predictions
that best accommodate the current sensory inputs” (Clark, 2016,
p. 121).
Focusing on Supportive Beliefs
In the hierarchical PP framework, the recruitment of high-level
predictions can explain prediction errors away and effectively
tell the upstream-flowing error units to “shut up” (Friston, 2005,
p. 829; also Clark, 2016, p. 38). Therefore, lower level inputs
which are well predicted by some higher level predictive model
are “quashed” or “explained away” (Clark, 2016, p. 60). Moreover,
PP proposes that conversely, by increasing attention, the gain of
error units can be increased. This is called “salience-based signal
enhancement” (ibid.). This leads to the boosting of prediction
error signals which are deemed reliable, which in turn inform
(or update) the predictive generative model, resulting in a very
basic form of Bayesian learning. Basically, the suppression or
enhancement of prediction error units serves the function of
either updating or not updating the Bayesian priors of the
predictive generative model.
Note that while this tuning of prediction errors is a very
efficient way of sampling the world, it is also prone to result
in “mutually misleading” cycles (Clark, 2016, pp. 71–72). This
is quite fundamental for understanding some of the more
problematic aspects of CD, particularly confirmation bias and
focus on supportive beliefs. Here, in particular, the precision
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weighting dynamics of PP can help social psychologists uncover
the roots of confirmation biases and means of self-justification
associated with CD reduction (see, e.g., Tavris and Aronson,
2008). Clark (2016, pp. 71–72) cites Siegel (2012) notion of
perceptual justification to enlighten the “dark side” of prediction
error reduction. In this scenario, Jill predicts that Jack is angry
at her, leading Jill to selectively sample her perceived visual
sensory input to find visual “evidence” for her anger. This in
turn, increases the posterior belief of the predictive hypothesis of
“Jack is angry,” leading effectively to “a worrying recipe for self-
fulfilling psycho-social knots and tangles” (Clark, 2016, p. 75).
This is not hard to relate to, for instance, climate denialism, where
climate denialists actively sample their information environment
to find further evidence for their prior beliefs (see, e.g., Lorenzoni
et al., 2007). A similar focus on supportive beliefs can be found
in Festinger (1957, p. 22) example of the smoker who actively
focuses on information which is supportive toward her or his
behavior, or in other words, information which is well predicted
by the generative model. Here too, dissonance avoidance appears
very similar to active prediction error reduction.
Adding Reconciliatory Cognitive Elements and Changing
Conflictive Cognitive Elements
A core tenet of PP is that prediction error can be reduced
by recruiting “new and better” predictions or by modulating
current ones so that they best accommodate current error signals
(Friston, 2010; Clark, 2016, p. 1). This compares with, in a
way, Festinger (1957) notion that cognitive elements can be
added or changed to reconcile dissonant elements. In practice,
in the predictive hierarchy, this can also imply that “higher level”
hypotheses are saved by adjusting or recruiting new predictions at
lower hierarchical levels. Practically, therefore, this could involve,
for instance, the arbitrary attitude changes often associated
with particular reactions to CD (Festinger and Carlsmith, 1959;
Cooper, 2007; Tavris and Aronson, 2008).
To exemplify such arbitrary attitude changes, it is helpful to
return to the origins of dissonance theory, which began with
a study on a cult known as the Seekers (Festinger et al., 1956;
Festinger, 1957, Ch. 10, see also Ch. 1 in Cooper, 2007 for a
summary). The original story follows, with PP interpretations in
brackets:
Festinger and his students documented a cult, “a serious
group” with strong premonitions [generative models] that the
world would end by a cataclysmic flood on December 21, 1955.
The cultists believed that they could be saved by unearthly beings
from the planet Clarion. The Seekers were so certain of their
premonitions [high-level prediction: “the world is going to end”]
that they sold their possessions and quit their jobs. Yet at the
day of the predicted event, with no flood at sight, the Seekers
were faced with a calamitous inconsistency [prediction error].
Initially, after midnight, the Seekers sought alternate explanations
[recruitment of arbitrary lower-level hypotheses], such as “some
of us are wearing items prohibited by Clarions,” which could
explain away the inconsistency. Eventually, the inconsistency
[prediction error] was diminished by an irrefutable message
[recruitment of alternative hypotheses] by the cult leader: “This
little group, sitting all night long, has spread so much goodness
and light that the God of the Universe spared the Earth from
destruction.” Prediction error – or dissonance – was attenuated
by saving the high-level hypothesis by recruiting consonant low-
level hypotheses. Funnily enough, the title of Festinger et al.
(1956) book, “When Prophecy Fails,” could therefore be as
rephrased as “When Prediction Fails.”
Moreover, PP can help us further understand the “magnitude”
of dissonance, which was a central concept in Festinger (1957)
original proposition of dissonance theory, although it has since
received less attention (Beauvois and Joule, 1996). Formalizing
the idea of magnitude, we imagine here the
“sum of all the dissonances involving some particular cognition
as ‘D’ and the sum of all the consonances as ‘C.’ Then we might
think of the total magnitude of dissonance as being a function of
‘D’ divided by ‘D’ plus ‘C.”’ (Festinger and Carlsmith, 1959, pp.
203–204).
This is, when described in lay terms, rather intuitive. For
instance, as the amount of cognitions which justify dissonance-
inducing behavior increase, the magnitude of dissonance (“D”
divided by “D plus C”) is reduced. If we make a speech counter
to our opinions, we must reduce the magnitude of dissonance
by recruiting consonant cognitions. If we can rationalize our
behavior by adding reconciliatory cognitive elements (e.g., “I
got paid for this” or “I was forced to do this”), the amount
of dissonance will diminish, as Festinger and Carlsmith (1959)
argued. However, the same phenomenon can also be interpreted
from the PP perspective, whereby the magnitude (the gain
or volume) of prediction errors can be reduced by recruiting
alternative hypotheses, which “explain away” the prediction error
(see particularly Ch. 2 in Clark, 2016). Therefore, increasing the
number of “consonant” predictions (by recruiting these higher
level hypotheses) would reduce the volume of prediction error.
The magnitude of dissonance, therefore, seems to be from the
PP perspective particularly related to the gain or volume of
prediction error units.
Avoidance of Dissonance
Fourth and finally, as discussed in Section “Predictive Processing:
A Brief Overview,” PP and the related free energy principle
propose that organisms are inclined to actively avoid error-
inducing or “surprising” states. PP and “active inference” (e.g.,
Friston, 2010; Clark, 2016) posit that the minimization of
prediction error is a driving force for organisms. This is, again,
a notion which has similarities with Festinger (1957, p. 3) at
its time provocative idea that CD and its active reduction are
“a motivating factor in its own right,” whereby “situations and
information” which would likely increase dissonance should be
actively avoided to keep our cognitive models “responsive to
reality.” As Clark (2016, p. 250 and 293) similarly writes, the
“whole apparatus (of prediction-based processing) exists only
in order to help animals achieve their goals while avoiding
fatally surprising encounters with the world.” If dissonance
is to be associated with prediction error, a position which I
argue for in the present text, an active tendency for avoiding
CD might then be understood as helping us avoid surprising
bodily (proprioceptive), attitudinal/emotional (interoceptive)
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and environmental (exteroceptive) information flows which
hinder our capabilities for achieving our goals.7 In Section “An
Evolutionary Rationale for Cognitive Dissonance?,” this idea is
elaborated further and shown in particular to be compatible with
action-based models of CD.
As it appears, several similarities exist between PP and CD
theory, namely, that they both deal with strikingly similar
accounts of reducing unexpected (or subjectively surprising)
mental states and encounters with the world. Arguably, however,
PP proposes a more dynamic model of surprise reduction. From
the PP point of view, dissonance reduction is not only about
the modulation of “cognitive elements” in a passive stimulus–
response manner, but is instead forward-looking and predictive.
From this perspective, active reduction of “predictive dissonance”
would serve as a primary driver for successful action in the
world by means of optimizing the prediction of incoming
sensory inputs. After all, the Bayesian brain proposed by PP
“is an inference engine that is trying to optimize probabilistic
representations of what caused its sensory input” to successfully
predict the world and understand its causal mechanisms (Friston,
2010, p. 130).
Therefore, a major rationale for relocating CD in the PP
framework is apparent from Festinger (1957, p. 11) following
quote: “the reality which impinges on a person will exert pressures
in the direction of bringing the appropriate cognitive elements into
correspondence with that reality.” Recall Clark (2015, p. 5) critique
of the standard passive and stimulus-driven cognitive model,
taking “energetic inputs from the senses” and “turning them into”
a coherent or consonant percept. CD, from the PP point of view,
then becomes not an inconsistency between two passive elements
of cognition “impinged” by a reality (as Festinger proposes), but
rather as an inconsistency between active downstream (action-
oriented) prediction and upstream flows of perceptual input.
Dissonance reduction can therefore be reframed as the active
and forward-looking reduction of conflicts between downstream
predictions and upstream errors.
It seems that from this perspective, CD is strongly associable
with “prediction error,” whereby CD might be useful to reframe,
by performing a “Bayesian flip” of sorts (Clark, 2016), as
“predictive dissonance.” This also comes an interesting response
to Beauvois and Joule (1996, p. xii), who in their “radical theory of
CD” note that dissonance is not a “theory of rationality, since the
dissonance reduction process it describes, while clearly cognitive
in nature, is also post-behavioral and consequently incapable
of preparing rational action.” Importantly, from a forward-
looking PP perspective, as returned to in detail in Section “An
Evolutionary Rationale for Cognitive Dissonance?,” particularly
the notion that dissonance is incapable of preparing rational
action can be questioned. This is because if dissonance is related
to, or in fact one form of, prediction error, dissonance is also
pre-behavioral and thus capable of preparing efficient, successful
and ecologically rational action in the long term. This might
not be rational in the homo economicus sense (i.e., from the
7These stimuli are defined as follows (see Clark, 2016): Interoceptive: stimuli
produced within an organism, which include emotional and attitudinal states.
Proprioceptive: stimuli relating to behavior, bodily movement, and position.
Exteroceptive: stimuli picked up from the surrounding external environment.
lens of rational choice theory), but can be generally “satisficing”
(Simon, 1956, 1972). As discussed in Section “An Evolutionary
Rationale for Cognitive Dissonance?,” this is not a triviality when
considering the possible evolutionary origins of CD.
Predictive processing can also shed light on another confusing
aspect of dissonance theory. Beauvois and Joule (1996, p. xvii)
lament that the original dissonance theory by Festinger (1957)
was misleading in that it led one to believe that a “dissonant
relation” between cognitions always generates a “dissonant
psychological state.” This is a conceptual problem which I believe
can be solved efficiently with the hierarchical formulation of
PP. While prediction errors, or “dissonant relations” between
cognitions stem all the way up from direct sensory flow, it
seems rather clear that these do not always induce dissonant
psychological states. Recall that in the predictive hierarchy, all
levels from highly abstract cognitions to lowest level sensory
data are “accountable to the others, furnishing an internally
consistent representation of sensory causes at multiple levels
of description” (Friston, 2010, p. 129). This suggests that
while dissonant relations could occur at multiple levels of the
predictive hierarchy, ranging from direct perceptive levels (“It
is raining even though it is sunny”) to more abstract identity-
related levels (“I flew to an academic conference and I feel
terrible about it because I have a pro-environmental identity”),
what we generally refer to as the psychological discomfort of
dissonance would lie at the higher end of this hierarchical
model.
Therefore, while “dissonant relations” or “prediction errors”
can exist anywhere in the hierarchical or lateral levels of the
predictive hierarchy, the psychological uncomfortable state of CD
(which psychologically motivates dissonance reduction) would
most likely be those persistent and recurrent prediction errors
higher in the hierarchical model. To illustrate this, imagine
Festinger (1957, p. 19) picnicker from Section “Dissonance in a
Nutshell” once more (see Figure 2). When the picnicker picks up
the sensory information signaling the existence raindrops (i.e.,
sees or feels raindrops), this sends upstream prediction error to
a higher-level generative model, such as “The weather is sunny
and picnic-friendly.” To reduce prediction error (or the dissonant
relation between cognitive elements), the generative model can be
updated to “It is rainy.” I doubt, however, that this alone would
induce what we call the psychological state of CD. However, we
could imagine the updated generative model “It is rainy” causing
further flows of prediction error to a higher-level generative
model, such as “I dislike and avoid rain.” The dissonant relation
between “It is rainy” and “I dislike and avoid rain” is already
closer to a psychologically uncomfortable state. One could take
this even further, and notice a new dissonant relation between “I
dislike and avoid rain” and the recognition that “Rain is vital,” or
the fact that humans and nature need rain to survive. Here, the
reduction of psychological dissonance (or higher-level prediction
error) could therefore be achieved by attitude change, with the
picnicker finally admitting that she, in fact, highly values rainfall.
In other words, the argument here is that while prediction error
does not always induce the psychological state of CD, CD is
always still one (high-level and persistent) form of prediction
error.
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FIGURE 2 | Distinguishing between dissonant relations and the psychological state of CD. While prediction error does not always induce the psychological state of
CD, CD is always prediction error.
Concluding this section, PP seems to have potential to
be informative for the future development of CD theory.
While both theories deal extensively with reductions of
surprise or inconsistency (prediction error and dissonance),
PP arguably gives CD valuable and informative context within
the broader perception-prediction-action framework (known
as active inference) and accommodates dissonance in the
hierarchical multi-level system of the predictive mind. This also
helps us demarcate dissonant cognitive elements from dissonant
psychological states, although the two are seen as part of the
same perceptual and cognitive process. In fact, the rather simple
“Bayesian flip” proposed by PP, I argue below, might even help
us understand why certain conservative dissonance reduction
strategies exist to begin with.
AN EVOLUTIONARY RATIONALE FOR
COGNITIVE DISSONANCE?
A PP take on CD can be discussed against a backdrop of
research which, on the one hand, suggests that dissonance
has strong evolutionary underpinnings (Egan et al., 2007), and
contrarily, research which questions the compatibility between
an in-born drive for dissonance reduction and human (cultural)
evolution (Perlovsky, 2013). In this section, I aim to show that
a theory of predictive dissonance can answer to both notions,
suggesting that not only is the drive for dissonance reduction
evolutionarily compatible (and even necessary), but that cultural
factors can also partly define what cognitive elements are
dissonant. The first proposition below is that since CD is from the
PP perspective one form of “prediction error,” it is little wonder
that similar processes are found from other (presumably also
PP, prediction error reducing) organisms. This is an important
idea to consider. In spite of long-standing interest in CD
theory, its developmental or evolutionary origins are still poorly
understood (Egan et al., 2007, p. 978). Second, there is nothing
counter-evolutionary in reducing dissonance. On the contrary,
prediction error reduction mechanisms are absolutely necessary
to maintain action-readiness in a highly contingent and uncertain
environment, where conservative reactions to dissonance or
prediction error also prevent the overfitting of our predictive
generative models to local ephemeral conditions. Below, these
two “whys” regarding the origins of CD are discussed.
Why #1: An Action-Based Model of
Dissonance
Harmon-Jones et al. (2015) suggest an action-based model to
extend the original theory of CD to respond to the question of
why cognitive inconsistency causes both the psychological state
of dissonance and the motivation for dissonance reduction. The
authors’ (ibid., p. 185) proposition – drawing on influences such
as William James and James J. Gibson, who also influenced the
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line of thought which led to at least Clark’s (2016) interpretation
of PP – is that cognition exists particularly to guide behavior,
and that the “negative affective state of dissonance is aroused by
not all cognitive conflict but, specifically, when cognitions with
action implications conflict with each other, making it difficult
to act.” Beauvois and Joule (1996, p. 8) seem to more or less
argue for a similar position, proposing that the “cognitive work
of dissonance reduction is oriented by a generative cognition
which is behavioral in nature” and that behavior in particular
“possesses a special status in establishing the total amount of
dissonance.” These ideas, again, are very compatible with the PP
picture of active inference, where the predictive engine serves
the fundamental purpose of guiding an organism’s behavior in
a noisy and uncertain world (Friston et al., 2016). Any prediction
errors inhibiting successful (and low-cost) behavior in such a
world should stand corrected.
Predictive processing is particularly valuable for further
understanding action-based dissonance since it proposes that
predictive perceptions must be internally coherent to provide
clear instructions for action. To highlight this aspect of PP, Clark
(2016), pp. 33–37; drawing from Hohwy et al., 2008) uses the
example of binocular rivalry. When different images (e.g., a face
and a house) are presented to the right and left eye, subjects
generally experience perceptual transitions from one percept (a
face) to another (a house). This alternation between percepts
(instead of perceiving a mixed face-house) occurs, according to
the PP narrative, because no single hypothesis accounts for all
the data, “so the system alternates between the two semi-stable
states” (ibid.). For action-oriented purposes, this makes sense:
we probably never have perceived or will perceive face-houses
in our actionable environments, and our generative system has
learned that “only one object can exist in the same place at the
same time” (Hohwy et al., 2008, p. 691). If the opportunities for
action, or affordances, of face-houses are unclear and previously
unencountered (i.e., the prior probability for a face-house is
low) it makes very little practical sense to perceive a face-house.
Affordances here and later in the present text are defined as the
relations between abilities to perceive and act and features of
the environment, or in other words, the actionable opportunities
afforded to a capable organism by the environment (Chemero,
2003, 2009; Kaaronen, 2017; also Gibson, 1979; Reed, 1996; Heft,
2001).
The same would arguably apply to the famous “duckrabbit,”
a Gestalt demonstration by Jastrow (1899) made famous by
Wittgenstein (1981). When faced with a picture simultaneously
resembling the heads of both a duck and a rabbit, we do
not perceive a “duckrabbit” but instead alternate between the
Gestalts “duck” and “rabbit.” This makes ecological sense, since
a hunter, for instance, would benefit very little from perceiving a
duckrabbit, as this perception affords no coherent or consonant
behavior and has not previously been encountered. A similar
example, generally attributed to Kuhn (2012) and Polanyi (1958),
can be made in the philosophy or psychology of science.
A scientist generally does not design an experiment from the
perspective of two contradictory theories. This is simply because
it even though it may be analytically feasible, it makes very little
pragmatic sense. As Polanyi (1958) writes, we can only encounter
the scientific world successfully by “dwelling” in or embodying
a theory and attending to the world from it, and one theoretical
perspective is generally complex enough to satisfice for practical
purposes. Predictive hypotheses, in science and in everyday life,
primarily guide action, and unnecessary dissonance or error
between contradictory actions should generally be eliminated to
guide smooth and uninterrupted behavior.
Cisek (2007, p. 1568) “affordance competition hypothesis”
can also be read to support this view. Here, Cisek argues
that to “survive in a hostile environment, one must be ready
to act at short notice, releasing into execution actions that
are at least partially prepared,” which requires processing
of “sensory information in an action-dependent manner to
build representations of the potential actions which the
environment currently affords.” Based on available information,
these competitive affordances (or opportunities for action) are
weighted against each other until a single action is selected.
Selecting two contradictory actions would simply be very
inefficient and impractical. Therefore, accordingly with the
predictive dissonance narrative proposed in this text, any
dissonant relations between competitive action hypotheses or
attitudinal or intentional states pertaining to action should be
reduced as quickly as possible.
A predictive dissonance account is largely in line with
recent action-based models of dissonance, and has potential
to be informative for the development of these theoretical
frameworks. If CD is understood as one form of prediction error,
it makes sense that it should be reduced to ensure successful
behavior in our variant ecological niche with multiple competing
affordances. As discussed in Section “Predictive Dissonance,”
Festinger (1957) did seem to have this in mind when formulating
the original definition of CD (where reduction of dissonance
keeps us behaviorally “responsive to reality”), but this stance
seemed to largely disappear from later studies, which were
increasingly focused on attitudinal dissonance and less on real-
world action-perception (see Cooper, 2007). Therefore, a theory
of predictive dissonance seems to agree with Harmon-Jones et al.
(2015) position that “dissonance processes primarily function to
facilitate effective action.”
Why #2: Overfitting Predictive Models
The other immediate “why” of dissonance relates to the statistical
properties of overfitting and underfitting. Overfitting a predictive
model here, as defined by Marweski et al. (2010, p. 106), would
entail the generative model capturing “not only the variance due
to the variables of interest but also that from random error,
which organisms are likely to encounter in an uncertain world.”
A predictive engine, such as the predictive mind proposed by
Clark (2016), is fundamentally in the business of extracting signal
from noise to prevent overfitting to a noisy, highly uncertain, and
ephemeral environment. As Feldman (2013, p. 25, also in Clark,
2016, p. 272) notes, this implies separating agent-salient signal
from noise to tune our priors to the world, selectively ignoring
much of what the sensory signal makes available: “one would be
unwise to fit one’s prior too closely to any finite set of observations
about how the world behaves, because inevitably the observations
are a mixture of reliable and ephemeral factors.”
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It seems that often CD and the associated information-
discarding is framed as something entirely irrational (this is
particularly evident in Perlovsky, 2013). Take, for instance,
the three main paradigms of dissonance research – induced-
compliance (Festinger and Carlsmith, 1959), difficult-decision
(Brehm, 1956), and effort-justification (Tavris and Aronson,
2008) – which all seem to focus on rather irrational aspects
of dissonance, such as seemingly arbitrary attitude changes and
systematic avoidance of contradictory information. However, in
the ecological niche we inhabit, boundedly rational, selectively
ignorant yet fast and frugal action-oriented cognition might be
the most efficient way to move about and make decisions (Clark,
2016, p. 1). While perception-action of this kind is not always
locally optimal, it is highly generalizable and broadly “satisficing”
(Simon, 1956, 1972). This is because too much learning can lead
to statistical overfitting, that is, updating the Bayesian priors of
the predictive generative model to conform so closely to one
set of local conditions that it is no longer generalizable to other
contexts.
This might afford a new window for understanding the
“origins of CD” and why dissonance occurs not only with adult
humans but also other cognitive (prediction error reducing)
organisms such human infants as capuchin monkeys (Egan et al.,
2007). After all, any PP organism will seek to reduce long-term
prediction error, so it is perhaps little surprise that cognitive
phenomena such as dissonance are found in other species. The
upshot is that if dissonance is related to prediction error, then
it is at least not at the most fundamental level a socio-culturally
acquired “learned secondary drive” (as cautiously suggested by
Cooper, 2007, p. 87–89), but rather something any organism
with a predictive engine will to an extent experience. The
“origin” of the psychological sensation of dissonance, from the
PP perspective, would then be its role in motivating prediction
error reduction in the long term. Such a strategy implies not
learning from just any discrepancies between cognitive elements,
since this would be suspect to overfitting. Therefore, even when
dissonance leads to a seemingly arbitrary conservation of a high-
level prediction (e.g., not learning from prediction error due to
self-justification or arbitrary attitude change), this does not entail
that it is entirely irrational. The predictive brain, as Clark (2016,
Ch. 8) amusingly writes, is after all quite “lazy,” but this might not
be a fault as much as it is a necessity.
To illustrate this idea, consider a thought experiment in a
social environment. Dissonance theory is, after all, originally a
social psychological theory, so uncovering its social rationale is
no triviality. Imagine here an early human called Proto, living in
a primitive small culture. This culture, like any human culture,
has shared meanings, intentions and norms, and the people of
this culture particularly value the simple norm “Sharing is good”
(you can insert practically any other simple norm here), leading
this norm to be instilled at a high abstract level in their generative
models. In practice, such a generative model corresponds to
an increased probability of engaging in altruistic behavior, or
P(Sharing) (since PP organisms, for better or worse, have a
knack for bringing their predictions about). Now, imagine that
for some reason, Proto does not share its food and, as a result,
experiences cascades of CD (or, if you may, prediction error). Is it
rational for Proto to update its generative model accordingly with
the prediction error? Arguably not, since this would eventually
lead to modulation of the high-level model “Sharing is good,”
a decrease in pre-behavioral P(Sharing) and thus lead to all
kinds of trouble in this primitive social setting (leading to, in
the worst case, punishment or expulsion). Here, for instance,
a more conservative self-justifying reaction to dissonance (e.g.,
recruitment of another cognitive element such as “I had no other
choice”; “Mistakes were made, but not by me. . .” etc., see Tavris
and Aronson, 2008) might prove to be more rational in the
long run. In other words, selectively ignoring and not learning
from dissonant social information might turn out to be a sound
long-term strategy.
Might dissonance then be a theory of rationality after all
(c.f. Beauvois and Joule, 1996)? Similar accounts of selective
ignorance of information, or simple use of “fast and frugal”
heuristics, are abound in the fields of bounded or ecological
rationality (e.g., Simon, 1972; Marewski et al., 2010; Todd and
Gigerenzer, 2012). However, the relations between ecological
rationality and CD seem much less charted. From the PP
perspective, CD might to at least some degree serve the purpose
of motivating organisms not to overfit their predictive models to
ephemeral local conditions.
This notion comes as a direct response to Perlovsky (2013,
p. 1), who expresses concern regarding the compatibility between
CD and human cultural evolution. According to Perlovsky (ibid.),
CD inhibits acquisition of new knowledge and is thus at conflict
with what fundamentally makes us human:
“This process of resolving CD by discarding contradictions is
usually fast, “momentary” and according to CD theory new
knowledge is discarded before its usefulness is established. This
is the paradoxical conclusion of CD theory. To summarize,
according to CD theory knowledge has to be devalued and
discarded. But accumulation of knowledge is the hallmark of
human evolution. It follows that the fact of human cultural
evolution contradicts this well-established theory.”
Perlovsky (2013, p. 2) then continues: “Why have researchers
of CD theory . . . not noticed this contradiction between its
fundamental premise and the fact of human evolution?”
In the following, I attempt to respond to these questions
regarding the compatibility between CD and human (cultural)
evolution. First, it should be noted that Perlovsky’s account of CD
is not entirely fair, since at least according to Festinger (1957)
original conception, CD can lead to direct learning (a smoker
might reduce dissonance by quitting the habit, and a picnicker
can and often will seek shelter from rain). Yet I also argue that
CD and evolution only contradict if we make the tacit assumption
that more information is better for behaving successfully in
the world. However, as recent advances in ecological rationality
suggest (see, e.g., Marewski et al., 2010; Todd and Gigerenzer,
2012), this is not always a justifiable assumption at all, since
agents in the real world “less” information is often “more.”
Representing the PP perspective, I believe Van de Cruys et al.
(2014, p. 1) make a valid point here: “The complex, fluctuating
nature of regularities in the world and the stochastic and noisy
biological system through which people experience it require
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that, in the real world, people not only learn from their errors
but also need to (meta-)learn to sometimes ignore errors.”
Perhaps the conservative reactions to CD are then exactly this
kind of “meta-learning,” or in Bateson’s (1972) cybernetic terms
“deutero-learning” or “second-order learning,” which help us to
selectively ignore prediction errors and thus prevent overfitting.
While this strategy sometimes fails miserably, in the long term it
might be effective.8
Returning to Perlovsky (2013) concerns, it seems that they
are strongly related to the so-called “darkened room puzzle”
discussed in PP literature (Clark, 2016), pp. 262–265; Friston
et al., 2012; Allen and Friston, 2018). The puzzle follows: Should
not a “hapless prediction-driven” and error-reducing (or, for the
present purpose, dissonance-reducing) organism seek out easily
predicted states, “such as an empty darkened room in which
to spend the remainder of its increasingly hungry, thirsty and
depressing days”? Do not the “hallmarks of human evolution”
(Perlovsky, 2013, p. 1) stand starkly in contrast to this? What
about cultural evolution, play, exploration, and attractions of
novelty (Clark, 2016, p. 262; Clark, 2017a)? The answer to the
puzzle lies in the relational, cultural and contextual nature of
concepts such as prediction error or dissonance. Even though it
might seem like organisms such as ours might experience less
“prediction error” in a dark corner in the everyday sense of the
word, this would in fact be highly error-inducing, since active
organisms such as humans take moving about and exploring as
a baseline for predicting everyday experiences. Therefore, being
stuck in an empty darkened room would be very surprising and
induce high levels of prediction error – or dissonance – and
we thus actively avoid such states. Thus, the PP treatment of
dissonance hardly characterizes it as “A Challenge to Human
Evolution,” as Perlovsky (2013) conspicuous title suggests. Rather,
dissonance reduction and the associated information-discarding
emerge as fundamental requirements for life in a noisy and
uncertain world.
Perlovsky (2013) builds his argument to propose that music
is one mechanism by which dissonance can be collectively
reduced. This may (or may not) be true, but it is only
one possible socio-cultural case for dissonance reduction. In
fact, we humans find our entire societies structured so that
we are expected to learn even contradictory information (see
Ch. 9 in Clark, 2016, 2017a). Take, for instance, schools and
universities, where students are assumed to challenge their
folk understanding of physics, society, or psychology. If an
undergraduate student, for instance, is socially and culturally
expected to learn information which is contradictory to their
prior knowledge, an incapability for learning such knowledge
would likely result in the highest magnitude of dissonance (i.e.,
much higher than the contradictory information causes by itself).
Reduction of dissonance could hereby, in some social settings,
simply entail learning. Socio-cultural scaffoldings, from the PP
8As an interesting and relevant side note, locally overfitted generative models,
which weigh some prediction errors significantly higher than the neurotypical
population, have been associated with traits found in the autism spectrum. Such
strategies result in overwhelming prediction errors and seem to lead to the
enforcement of predictable, and arguably less broadly adaptable, routines (Van de
Cruys et al., 2013, p. 96, also in Clark, 2016, p. 226).
perspective, therefore serve as collective bootstraps which instill
to our predictive minds the norms of learning and exploring
(Clark, 2017a), even when this information is dissonant with
prior cognitions. This is quite a different picture from Festinger
(1957, p. 20) claim that “the possibilities of manipulating the
environment [to reduce dissonance] are limited.” From a socio-
cultural PP perspective (see Clark, 2016; Ramstead et al., 2016),
environment manipulation and niche construction (Constant
et al., 2018) can be interpreted as being fundamental to
dissonance reduction and consequent meta-learning patterns.
We live, as Clark (2016) calls it, in “bootstrap heaven,” where
a “ratchet-effect” (Tomasello, 1999) of socio-cultural processes
takes place to create new environments with novel expectations –
this also alters what we experience as “prediction error” or “CD,”
which appear to be highly culture-dependent concepts (Clark,
2017a).
The long-term weighting of prediction errors is a delicate
business, as updating the Bayesian priors of our predictive
engines can (and, in practice, do) result both in over- and
underfitted generative models. Dissonance, it seems, might
fundamentally be related to the prevention of overfitting,
although the side-effect of this is obvious. Dissonance reduction
via selective sampling, for instance, might also cause drastically
underfitted generative models, leading to persistent confirmation
biases (Clark, 2016). But this is the price, if you may, of
the generalizable, ecologically rational, and action-enabling
predictive dynamic. An active species such as ours, after all,
operates in a “rich landscape of affordances,” or an ecological
niche with spectacularly rich and variant opportunities for action
(Rietveld and Kiverstein, 2014). A rich affordance landscape,
in turn, requires a highly generalizable and efficient predictive
model. That, at least for our species, seems to have been
phylogenetically satisficing (this is, in fact, self-evidenced by our
very existence, see Friston, 2018). However, as discussed briefly
below in Section “Underfitted Generative Models and Ecological
Crises,” this strategy of overfitting-prevention is causing all kinds
of trouble in a 21st century context, where our ecological niches




I end with a normative note. CD is arguably one of the
more relevant cognitive phenomena in understanding the roots
of the global ecological crisis. This is due to the apparently
prominent role that CD plays in the so-called attitude–action
gap in environmental psychology (see Kollmuss and Agyeman,
2002; Kaaronen, 2017; Uren et al., 2018) as well as climate
denialism and other ecological “denialisms” (Lorenzoni et al.,
2007). Here, it seems, dissonance arising between generative
models and sensory input (e.g., dissonance between attitudes and
action) is explained away by mechanisms such as delegation of
responsibility, distancing, apathy, denial, and active avoidance of
contradictory information (Stoll-Kleemann et al., 2001; Kollmuss
and Agyeman, 2002). Simply, we are not updating our predictive
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generative models to adequately respond to the urgency at hand.
Therefore, studying CD in this day and age might be more
important than ever before.
Phenomena such as climate denialism might be understood
better through the PP viewpoint, which would posit that strong
priors (i.e., mental models attuned to environmentally harmful
behavioral habits) combined with low attention and selective
sampling are at least partly to blame for the poor uptake of
new behaviors and evidence-informed local and global policies.
The latter case is particularly interesting, since while science
already deals with separating noise from signal, subjectively
perceived sensory inputs (e.g., from science communication)
might still be treated as any other noise by a layperson’s
predictive model (see Stoll-Kleemann et al., 2001 and Lorenzoni
et al., 2007 for relevant empirical cases). This, one could argue,
results in radical underfitting, and many typical reactions to
climate dissonance – such as self-justification, avoidance of
contradictory information, or delegation of responsibility – do
not nearly as much prevent overfitting as they induce systematic
underfitting, risking the future minimization of prediction error,
and thus human existence. Our locally tuned and “fast and frugal”
predictive minds, it seems, are not particularly well suited for
dealing with the prediction of slow, abstract, and global non-
linear phenomena, such as ecocide, the sixth mass extinction,
and climate change, which would only induce unavoidable high-
volume prediction error when irreversible ecological tipping-
points9 are reached, or when it is too late.
Perhaps a further developed theory of predictive dissonance
could inform new models of environmental education,
communication and behavioral policies, which would focus
on ways to induce salience-based error signal enhancement (i.e.,
“boosting” relevant error signals). I have suggested elsewhere
that a necessary starting point for this would be the design of
urban environments, urban affordances and environmental
education which promote local “action-first” environmentalism,
by increasing attention toward environmental concerns via
structurally induced behavior (Kaaronen, 2017). Undeniably,
however, much further research and experimentation is required.
PP presents an interesting opportunity here, by employing
cutting-edge understanding of the mechanisms of the human
mind to help us in the “art of the cognitive war to save the planet”
(Antal and Hukkinen, 2010).
CONCLUSION
I have argued in this article that PP (also predictive coding)
can help us further understand the theory of CD, and that the
theory of CD could be accommodated within the broader PP
framework. The PP take on CD, in this article, has been dubbed
“predictive dissonance.” This owes to the notion that it seems like
CD is strongly related to the concept of prediction error in PP.
Conclusively, PP can be interpreted to shed further light on:
9Tipping points are situations where an ecosystem experiences abrupt and often
self-reinforcing transitions to new distinct states, with significant implications for
climate, biodiversity, and other ecological and social systems (Barnosky and Hadly,
2015).
• What CD is. From the PP perspective, dissonance arises
from upstream error signals weighed variably against
downstream predictive generative models. This can also
be dubbed “predictive dissonance.” The magnitude of
dissonance is a function of the gain or volume and
persistence or recurrence of error signals. Predictive
dissonance can be reduced by either updating the predictive
model, recruiting alternative predictive models or changing
behavior and moving about in the social and material world
(altering the harvested information flow).
• Where CD exists. From the PP perspective dissonance can
occur at different hierarchical (or lateral) levels in the
multi-level predictive hierarchy. This, at least partly, solves
the dilemma of whether “dissonant relations” between
cognitions always generate a “dissonant psychological
state” (Beauvois and Joule, 1996). A theory of predictive
dissonance proposes that while “dissonant relations” or
“prediction errors” can exist anywhere in the hierarchical
or lateral levels of the predictive hierarchy, a psychological
uncomfortable state of CD would most likely be those
persistent prediction errors higher in the predictive
hierarchy.
• Why CD exists to begin with. Egan et al. (2007, p. 982)
speculate whether there “may be some core aspects of
cognition that give rise to CD” to enlighten its evolutionary
origins and, indeed, such a mechanism might be explained
by a theory of predictive dissonance. As discussed
in Section “An Evolutionary Rationale for Cognitive
Dissonance?,” conservative responses to dissonance could
exist at least partly to prevent the overfitting of predictive
models to local and ephemeral conditions, since this
would lead to poorly generalizable predictions. From
this perspective, dissonance is not “post-behavioral” or
“incapable of preparing rational action” (c.f. Beauvois and
Joule, 1996), but also pre-behavioral and (often, but not
always) capable of preparing ecologically rational, fast and
frugal, action. Dissonance then, is very action-oriented
indeed – a notion which resonates well with the work of
Harmon-Jones et al. (2015). Any strategy which prevents
overfitting, however, is suspect to underfitting (or not
learning from prediction errors from which one ought to
learn), which might propagate some ecologically unsound
cognitive phenomena such as climate denialism and similar
biases.
A picture of CD is therefore painted where perception and
action are self-fulfilling prophecies, and “When Prophecy Fails”
(to evoke the title of Festinger et al., 1956), we experience varying
magnitudes of dissonance. CD has helped and still does help
organisms such as ours to “surf the waves of uncertainty” (Clark,
2016), but in today’s world, this seems to often happen at a
dire ecological and social cost. Since CD is presumably here
to stay, we need to bring it up to date with the most recent
advances in cognitive sciences. I have proposed in this paper
that CD can be accommodated in the broader cognitive theory
of PP. PP is a hastily and widely propagating theory, with
new developments in a variety of fields ranging from machine
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learning to psychopathology, and keeping dissonance theory
up to date with these advances and even their computational
and experimental methodologies could pave a fruitful way
forward.
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